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Does Market Structure Matter? 





We document that bid-ask spreads decrease substantially for stocks that moved from Nasdaq to 
the NYSE between 1996 and 2000, and that spread reductions continued to be observed after the 
1997 market reforms.  Somewhat surprising in light of these reforms, the largest spread 
reductions are for stocks where Nasdaq liquidity providers round quotations most often.  We 
extend the analysis to document that average return volatility also decreases substantially after 
exchange listing.  However, spreads, volatility, and trading activity are determined jointly in 
equilibrium, implying that simple before versus after comparisons may not reveal structural 
effects.  The results of simultaneous equation estimation indicate that decreases in average bid-
ask spreads are attributable to market structure, while reductions in volatility and trading volume 
can be attributed to changes in other endogenous and exogenous variables, including the spread 







Does Market Structure Matter? 
Trading Costs and Return Volatility Around Exchange Listings 
 
Introduction 
  A well functioning financial market provides price discovery and low-cost liquidity, without excessive 
volatility in prices.  Does the structure of a financial market affect its functionality?   We provide some 
empirical evidence on this issue by examining changes in bid-ask spreads, return volatility, and trading 
activity for 320 stocks that moved from the Nasdaq’s dealer-based Stock Market to the New York Stock 
Exchange’s specialist-assisted auction market between 1996 and 2000.   
Christie and Huang (1994), Kadlec and McConnell (1994), and Barclay (1997) have all 
documented decreases in average bid-ask spreads for stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE during 
earlier sample periods.  We confirm this finding, and extend this literature in several dimensions.  First, we 
provide updated evidence, verifying that average bid-ask spreads continue to decrease after Exchange 
listing in the more recent data, and even after the 1997 reforms of the Nasdaq Stock market.   Second, we 
extend the analysis to volatility, documenting that return volatility decreases on average after stocks move 
to the NYSE.   The reduction in return volatility is observed even after allowing for decreases in “bid-ask” 
bounce attributable to smaller spreads, and after controlling for changes in market-wide return volatility. 
Third, and most important, we use simultaneous equation methods to examine the extent to which 
changes in endogenous spreads and volatility can be attributed to market structure, as opposed to changes in 
other endogenous and exogenous variables.   For example, microstructure theory implies that volatility 
affects equilibrium bid-ask spreads, both because volatility increases inventory-related costs of market 
making (as in Ho and Stoll (1980)), and because volatility is likely to be associated with informed trading 
and adverse selection costs (as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).   Reductions in average spreads after 
Exchange listing could, in principle, be attributable to reductions in volatility rather than market structure, 
per se.   Likewise, volatility reductions might be attributable to changes in trading activity or in spreads 
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rather than market structure.    
The results of implementing simultaneous equation estimation methods indicate that the reduction 
in bid-ask spreads after Exchange listing is indeed structural: trading costs are significantly affected by 
market structure.   In contrast, the observed reduction in average return volatility is attributable to changes 
in other economic variables rather than market structure.  The absence of a structural listing effect on return 
volatility is consistent with the reasoning that volatility is determined by the rate of information flow for the 
stock, and not by the structure of the market where the stock is traded.  
Finally, we contribute to the recurring debate as to whether return volatility can be decreased by 
imposing a “transactions tax”.  Several authors have argued in favor of taxes on financial market trades,  
reasoning that higher trading costs will curb “excessive” speculation by dissuading those traders who have 
short investment horizons.1  The results of the simultaneous equation system reported here indicate that an 
increase in trading costs is associated with an increase in return volatility.  This finding, and also the result 
that both average spreads and average return volatility decrease after listing, is at odds with reasoning that 
volatility can be decreased by increasing transactions costs, as the proponents of transactions taxes presume.  
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the sample as well as the measures of 
trading costs and volatility that are employed.  Section II presents average bid-ask spreads and return 
standard deviations before and after Exchange listing.  Section III reports on cross-sectional analysis and 
simultaneous equation analysis of the changes in spreads and volatility, while Section IV concludes.  
 
I: Sample Selection and Empirical Measures. 
We use various issues of the annual NYSE Fact Book to identify all 320 firms that moved from the 
Nasdaq stock market to the NYSE during calendar years 1996 to 2000.  The number of Nasdaq to NYSE 
transfers appears to have increased in recent years.  The current sample includes an average of 64 firms per 
 
1 These include Summers and Summers (1989), Stiglitz (1989), and Eichengreen, Tobin, and Wyploz (1995). Hau 
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year.  By comparison, the 1983 to 1992 sample used by Barclay (1997) contains an average of 29 Nasdaq to 
NYSE transfers per year.  The increase in transfers likely reflects in part the increase in the number of 
Nasdaq listed stocks that meet Exchange listing requirements.   
Cursory examination of the data indicates that a subset of these stocks was not actively quoted 
while listed on Nasdaq.   In particular, we observed many stock/dates on which a Nasdaq quote is entered 
before the market opens, but no quote update occurs during the trading day.   In general the Nasdaq stocks 
that are not frequently quoted are smaller and have wider spreads than those that are frequently quoted.   
While we report some summary statistics for the full sample of 320 stocks, most of our empirical analysis 
focuses on a restricted sample of 154 stocks.  Stocks are excluded if there are trading dates during which no 
quote update is entered during normal trading hours.  The main reason for this exclusion is that quote-based 
volatility measures will be biased downward during intervals when quotes are not updated.  For rest of the 
paper, we refer to the original sample of 320 firms as the ‘full sample’ and the sample of 154 firms with 
regular quote updates as the ‘restricted sample’. 
We focus on the 180 calendar days around Exchange listing.  A longer interval could improve the 
precision of point estimates due to the use of more data, but more elapsed calendar time also allows the 
possibility of significant changes in firm characteristics, thereby diluting the extent to which observed 
changes can be associated with the change in market structure.      
To assess whether volatility changes after Exchange listing, we focus on quotation midpoints, rather 
than trade prices, as the volatility of trade-price returns will be affected by the movement of prices between 
the bid and ask quotes.  Raw quotation data is obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database made 
available by the NYSE.  We use only Nasdaq quotes before listing and NYSE quotes after listing.  Blume 
and Goldstein (1997) document that market makers off the NYSE occasionally post quotes that improve on 
those of the NYSE, implying that our exclusive use of NYSE quotations introduces a slight bias against 
 
(2001) describes recent proposals to impose transactions taxes in European financial markets.   
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finding lower spreads after listing.  The average quoted spread is measured for each firm before and after 
Exchange listing as the time-weighted average of individual quotation spreads.  Most of reported results are 
reported on an absolute (dollar) basis.  We also examine spreads as a percentage of the bid-ask midpoint, 
and find very similar results.2 
We record the midpoints of the quotations in effect at 9.30 a.m. and at 4 p.m., and examine the 
volatility of daily (4 p.m. to 4 p.m.) and intraday (9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.) quote mid-point returns.3  Also, the 
possibility that changes in volatility after Exchange listing could simply reflect changes in overall market 
volatility around the time of transfers is investigated.  To do so, we examine standardized volatility 
measures where each firm’s pre and post-listing return volatilities are divided by the volatilities of the S&P 
500 Index over the same 90-day intervals.  
Statistical significance of the changes in average bid-ask spreads and volatility after Exchange 
listing is assessed using simple non-parametric sign tests.  If changes in spreads and volatility after 
Exchange listing are random then we would expect to observe increases for 50% of firms and decreases for 
the other 50%.  The percentage of firms that actually show a decrease in each measure is recorded and a 
simple binomial sign test used to assess whether this percentage differs from the benchmark of 50.  We also 
report the mean spread before and after listing, as well as the median volatility before, median volatility 
after, and median change in volatility.  
We consider results for several subsamples. To assess whether changes in bid-ask spreads and 
volatility after Exchange listing depend on firm size, we divide the sample into three equal subsamples 
based on market capitalization at the listing date.   To determine whether improvements in spreads and 
 
2 Earlier studies of Exchange listings, including Barclay (1997) and Christie and Huang (1994), examined effective 
bid-ask spreads as well as quoted spreads.  Effective spreads measure how close trade execution prices are to the mid-
point of the bid and ask quotes, and thereby capture any benefits due to trading within the quotes.  However, Schultz 
(2000) documents significant problems with the time stamps for Nasdaq trades during the early years of our sample 
interval.  As a consequence, no comparisons of effective spreads are provided here.  
3 All prices in the volatility analyses are adjusted for stock splits.  Splits after Exchange listing are identified based on 
data in the TAQ Master file, while splits before Exchange listing are identified based on data on shares outstanding 
kindly provided by Tim McCormick of the Nasdaq Stock Market.   
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volatility occur primarily for firms with relatively poor liquidity while listed on the Nasdaq market, we 
examine three subsets of firms based on average pre-listing bid-ask spreads.  Barclay (1997) documents that 
decreases in bid-ask spreads upon Exchange listing are largest for firms whose Nasdaq market-makers 
avoided odd-eighth quotes. To determine whether this regularity continues to hold for the more recent data 
we separate the sample based on Nasdaq quote rounding frequencies.  
Finally, we consider separately the experience of firms that listed on the NYSE after the 1997 
reforms of the Nasdaq market.  New order-handling rules mandated by the SEC were implemented during 
1997, with stocks phased in on various dates.4  Information provided on NASD web sites is used to 
determine the dates at which sample stocks became subject to the new order handling rules, and to identify 
a subsample of stocks that were subject to the new order handling rules for all of their last 90 days before 
Exchange listing.  
Tables 1 and 2 provide some summary data regarding the full and restricted samples.  Average 
share prices are little altered after Exchange listing for either the full or the restricted sample.   For the full 
sample, the time weighted number of quotes reported per day declines from an average of 125.34 before 
listing to 113.78 after listing.  However, the median number of quotes per day increases from 29.17 to 
64.20.  The difference in the direction of change in mean and median estimates indicates that some firms are 
much more heavily quoted on the Nasdaq than they are on the NYSE.  The time weighted percentage of 
quotes rounded to even eighths of a dollar in the full sample averages 59.85% on Nasdaq, compared to 
41.13% on the NYSE.   
Comparing the full and restricted samples, it is apparent that those stocks excluded from the main 
study are quoted much less frequently, and are smaller.  The mean market capitalization of stocks in the 
restricted sample is $1.63 billion, compared to $466 million for the stocks excluded from the restricted 
sample.  The average number of quote updates per day prior to listing is 214 for stocks in the restricted 
 
4For a description of the order handling rules, see Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999). 
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sample, compared to 42 for the stocks eliminated from the final sample. 
Table 2 indicates that that average pre-listing bid-ask spread for the full sample of stocks is 44.7 
cents.  By comparison, the average pre-listing spread for the restricted sample is 30.8 cents, and the average 
pre-listing spreads for stocks excluded from the restricted sample is 57.7 cents.   Since the restricted sample 
excludes stocks with relatively wide Nasdaq spreads, our results are biased away from finding narrower 
spreads after listing.  Indeed, the average reduction in bid-ask spreads after Exchange listing is larger for the 
full sample (24.8 cents) than for the restricted sample (13.1 cents).   
Table 2 also provides some summary evidence regarding volatility for the full and restricted 
samples. The median decrease in full sample close-to-close return volatility after Exchange listing is 0.24 
percent, and 63.1% of full sample firms show a decrease in close-to-close return volatility.   Corresponding 
figures for the restricted sample are almost identical: the median decrease in close-to-close return volatility 
after exchange listing is 0.29 percent, and 64.2% of restricted sample firms show a decrease in close to 
close return volatility.  The similarity in close-to-close volatility declines across the full and restricted 
samples indicates that our overall conclusions regarding volatility changes are unlikely to be affected by 
omitting stocks whose quotes are sometimes not updated during regular trading hours.    
The infrequently-quoted stocks that are excluded from our restricted sample have relatively wide 
spreads, but similar close-to-close volatility as compared to the more-actively quoted stocks included in the 
restricted sample.  Apparently, Nasdaq market makers post wide spreads for some stocks on some days and, 
protected from informed traders by the wide spreads, do not update quotations until the following day.   If 
so, intraday volatility estimates will be affected.   Indeed, the evidence reported on Table 2 indicates that 
inference regarding intraday price movements is sensitive to including stocks whose quotes are not updated 
frequently.  In particular, the median standard deviation of half-hour returns prior to Exchange listing is 
0.72 percent for the restricted sample, compared to 0.47 for the full sample.   The absence of timely quote 
updates reduces the intraday volatility that can be observed, even if stocks are not truly less volatile.  For 
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the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on the restricted sample of 154 firms to examine the volatility 
changes.  It should be noted though that our most important conclusion: that both trading costs and return 
volatility decline after Exchange listing, holds in the full as well as the restricted sample.  Section II.B. 
below provides a more complete investigation of volatility changes after Exchange listing.  
 
II. Average Bid-Ask Spreads and Return Volatility Around Exchange Listings  
This section reports on cross-sectional average bid-ask spreads and return volatility during the last 
90 days before and first 90 days after Exchange listing.  Section III below provides cross-sectional analysis 
of the firm-by-firm changes in spreads and volatility, and reports on results of estimating a simultaneous 
system to ascertain whether the structural effects of Exchange listing are responsible for the observed 
changes in mean spreads and volatility.   
A. Bid-Ask Spreads 
Table 3 reports average bid-ask spreads in cents per share before and after Exchange listing for the 
restricted sample and for each subsample described above.  Bid-ask spreads decline markedly after 
Exchange listing.  For all the firms in the restricted sample, the decline is from a median of 24.9 cents on 
Nasdaq to a median of 16.7 cents on the NYSE.  Eighty two percent of the firms in the sample saw a 
reduction in average spreads. 
Every subsample, with two exceptions, saw significant reductions in average spreads after listing.  
By market capitalization, the smallest firms have the largest decreases in spreads.  As might be expected, 
firms that had the widest spreads while listed on Nasdaq show the greatest decline in spreads after 
Exchange listing.  For this group the median Nasdaq spread was 44.6 cents, while the average NYSE spread 
is 18.8 cents, and all of the 51 firms in this group saw a spread reduction after listing.  In contrast, those 
stocks with relatively narrow Nasdaq spreads saw minimal reductions after listing.  This group had post-
listing bid-ask spreads averaging 13.5 cents, compared to 13.7 cents before listing.   
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Firms whose Nasdaq market makers avoided odd-eighth quotations also saw large spread 
reductions upon Exchange listing.  For the “high avoidance” subsample the median reduction in spreads is 
from 42.3 cents on Nasdaq to 18.8 cents on the NYSE, with ninety eight percent of firms showing a 
reduction in spreads.  In contrast, the “low avoidance” subsample shows a much smaller and statistically 
insignificant spread reduction, from 14.4 cents on Nasdaq to 13.9 cents on the NYSE, with only 25 of the 
51 firms experiencing spread reductions.  These results, obtained for firms transferring to the NYSE during 
the 1996-2000 period, are quite similar to those reported by Barclay (1997) for the 1983-1992 period, and 
indicate that the extent to which spreads on the Nasdaq dealer market exceed spreads on the NYSE 
specialist-auction market continues in the more recent data to be related to whether Nasdaq dealers use odd-
eighths in their quotations.  
Firms that moved to the NYSE after the introduction of Nasdaq reforms also experienced decreases 
in average bid-ask spreads.  For the 113 firms in this group, the reduction is from a mean (median) spread 
of 29.0 cents (23.3 cents) on Nasdaq to 17.5 cents (16.5 cents) on the NYSE, and 86 of the individual firms 
showed spread reductions.  Demsetz (1997) conjectures that NYSE spreads are narrower than Nasdaq 
spreads because the public is able to compete with the NYSE specialist by posting limit orders, while in the 
past this capability did not exist on Nasdaq.   Among the 1997 reforms of the Nasdaq market was the 
requirement that limit orders be displayed as Nasdaq quotes when they improve on dealer quotes.  The 
observation that spreads decline after Exchange listing even with the new order-handling rules in place 
indicates that the Demsetz explanation does not fully explain cross-exchange differences in spreads.5  
However, it should be noted that while the reduction in average spreads for the post-reform sample of 11.6 
 
5 A possible explanation for the continued observation of lower trading costs on the NYSE is the widespread use of 
preferencing agreements on the Nasdaq market.  Huang and Stoll (1996), Godek (1996), and Dutta and Madhavan 
(1997) have all conjectured that preferencing arrangements, under which order flow is directed by preexisting 
agreement to market makers, are responsible for wider Nasdaq spreads.  Bloomfield and O’Hara (1998) provide 
experimental evidence indicating that incentives to compete for order flow by improving quotations are reduced if a 
large proportion of order flow is subject to preferencing agreements.  More recently, Chung, Chuwonganant, and 
McCormick (2001) provide the first direct empirical evidence on the issue.  They study Nasdaq-listed stocks, and find 
that quotes are less competitive and spreads are wider for those stocks with more preferenced order flow.  
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cents is substantial, it is less than the reduction of 17.4 cents observed for sample firms that moved before 
the Nasdaq reforms were completed.6  The key result of this analysis is that companies that transferred from 
Nasdaq to the NYSE in the recent data continue to experience substantive decreases in trading costs.  We 
now examine return volatility before and after Exchange listing.   
 
B. Return Volatility 
We examine volatility by focusing on returns that are constructed from the midpoints of the last 
quote reported before 4 p.m. each day.  Since these returns are based on midpoints they should be 
unaffected by “bid-ask bounce”, whose impact would be reduced after Exchange listing.  The standard 
deviation of these returns is computed for the last 90 days before and the first 90 days after Exchange listing 
for each firm.  Table 4 reports the cross-sectional median standard deviation for the full sample and several 
subsamples, and the percentage of firms experiencing a reduction in return volatility after Exchange listing.  
Results reported on Table 4 indicate that volatility is on average lower after Exchange listing.  For 
all stocks in the restricted sample, the cross sectional median volatility of daily quote midpoint returns is 
3.06% before listing as compared to 2.83% after Exchange listing.  Ninety nine of the 154 firms have lower 
quote-based return volatility after Exchange listing, and this proportion (64.3%) of firms with volatility 
reductions exceeds significantly (p-value = .0004) the benchmark of fifty.   
The strength of the evidence regarding volatility reductions varies somewhat across subsamples.  
Evidence of volatility reductions is generally strongest for small firms, firms with a high degree of odd-
eighth avoidance by Nasdaq market makers, and firms with wide Nasdaq spreads.   Although point 
estimates indicate volatility reductions after Exchange listing for all subsamples, the evidence is statistically 
weak for firms with a low degree of odd-eighth avoidance and those that had narrower Nasdaq spreads.  
 
 
6 Tse (2001) also examines recent evidence, and finds that stocks that move from the Nasdaq to AMEX continue to 
experience reductions in spreads. 
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The determinants of cross-sectional variation in volatility reductions are examined more formally and in a 
multivariate setting in section III below.     
It is possible that changes in volatility after Exchange listing could reflect changes in overall market 
volatility rather than the structural shift in trading costs.  For example, the overall market was unusually 
turbulent during the last half of October 1997.  If an unusually large number of firms listed just before 
(after) this period then the tests would be biased toward finding higher (lower) volatility after Exchange 
listing.  To investigate this possibility we construct a standardized volatility measure.  We measure the 
volatility of S&P 500 Index returns over firm-specific 90-day pre and post-listing periods, and standardize 
each stock’s volatility measures by dividing by the matched S&P 500 volatilities.  Each standardized 
volatility measure can be interpreted as the firm’s volatility relative to that of the S&P 500 during the 
relevant 90 day interval. 
Table 5 reports average standardized volatility measures.  These results indicate that the evidence of 
lower return volatility after Exchange listing is strengthened by allowing for changes in overall market 
volatility.  For the full sample, the cross-sectional median ratio of firm volatility to S&P volatility is 2.84 
times prior to Exchange listing, compared to 2.33 times after Exchange listing.  Seventy four percent of 
sample firms experience a decrease in return volatility relative to that of the overall market after Exchange 
listing.  The proportion of firms experiencing a decrease in standardized volatility exceeds significantly the 
benchmark of fifty for the full sample (p-value < .0001) and for all subsamples (each p-value < .015).  
Notably, significant decreases in standardized volatility continue to be observed for stocks that moved to 
the NYSE after the 1997 reforms of the Nasdaq market. 
To assess whether the observed volatility changes reflect differences in the evolution of prices 





                                                
quotes in effect at 4 p.m. to those in effect at 9:30 a.m.7  The results reported in Table 6 indicate that the 
majority of the volatility reduction reflects intraday price changes.  The median reduction in intraday return 
volatility is 0.17%, compared to a median reduction of 0.29% in daily (4 p.m. to 4 p.m.) volatility.  Of the 
154 firms, 90 (58.4%) experienced a decline in intraday volatility, and this percentage again exceeds 
significantly (p-value = .006) the benchmark of fifty.  The results in Table 6 show decreases in median 
intraday volatility for every subsample, though the statistical significance varies.  The strongest evidence of 
decreases in intraday volatility is for small stocks, stocks with wide Nasdaq spreads, stocks that transferred 
to the NYSE before the Nasdaq reforms, and stocks with high odd-eighth avoidance on Nasdaq.   
 To summarize, the evidence indicates that return volatility decreases after stocks move from 
Nasdaq to the NYSE.  This result is not attributable to reductions in “bid-ask bounce”, since we measure 
returns from quotation midpoints.  Nor is it attributable to contemporaneous shifts in market-wide volatility, 
as controlling for overall stock market volatility strengthens rather than weakens the evidence.    
 
III: Cross-sectional Variation in Spread and Volatility Changes After Exchange listing 
The results reported in Tables 2 through 6 demonstrate that bid-ask spreads and return volatility 
both decrease on average after Exchange listing.  However, there is cross-sectional variation in the results, 
with some firms experiencing increases.   Also, other variables, including trading activity, average share 
price, and quotation characteristics change after Exchange listing.  As Barclay (1997) points out, reductions 
in spreads might be attributable to changes in other economic variables.  In this section we report the results 
of multivariate analysis of the firm-by-firm changes in spreads and volatility.  The purpose is to explain 
cross-sectional variation in changes in spreads and volatility, and to ascertain whether the observed 
reductions in mean spreads and volatility can be attributed to changes in other economic variables.  
A. Multivariate Analysis of Spread and Volatility Changes 
 
7 We also examined changes in the volatility of quote returns measured over half-hour intervals.  Results, which are 
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We begin by estimating a series of multiple regressions, where the dependent variable for each 
regression is the change from the time of Nasdaq listing to the time of NYSE listing in a spread or volatility 
measure, while the independent variables include firm size and changes in variables known from prior 
research (e.g. Harris (1994)) to be related to spreads and volatility.  Explanatory variables include market 
capitalization at the listing date, the change in average share price, the change in the number of quote 
updates per day, the change in the percentage of quotations rounded to even eighths of a dollar, an indicator 
variable to distinguish between firms listed before and after Nasdaq market reform (0=before and 1=after), 
and trading activity.   The interpretation of reported share volume differs across dealer and auction 
markets.8   As a consequence, we follow Barclay (1997) in using both average pre-listing (Nasdaq) volume 
and average post-listing (NYSE) volume as explanatory variables, as opposed to using the change in 
reported volume.  Results of the cross-sectional regressions analyses analysis are reported in Table 7.  
Results are reported both with odd eighth variables included and excluded.   
A.1. Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads 
Panel A of Table 7 reports on the determinants of cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spread 
changes after Exchange listing.  The most important variable in this analysis is the change in the proportion 
of quotations that are rounded to even eighths of a dollar.  The coefficient on this variable is very significant 
in a statistical sense, with a t-statistic of 6.1 (3.8 when explaining the change in percentage spreads), and is 
large in an economic sense.  The point estimate of 0.99 implies that a reduction in the proportion of quotes 
rounded to quarters from 47.9% (the pre-listing Nasdaq restricted-sample mean) to 35.9% (the post-listing 
restricted-sample NYSE average) is associated with a decrease in quoted spreads of 11.9 cents, ceteris 
paribus.  By comparison, the average quoted spread before moving to the NYSE is 30.8 cents.  The 
coefficient estimate on the product of the change in odd-eighth avoidance and the post reform indicator is 
 
available from the authors on request, support similar conclusions to those reported. 
8 A customer buy order and a customer sell order would lead to two reported trades on a dealer market, but could cross 
and be reported as a single trade on an auction market.  Dealer market volume may also reflect interdealer trades 
undertaken to rebalance inventory.   See Dyl and Anderson (2002) for additional discussion and analysis of reported 
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positive and statistically significant as well, indicating that odd-eighth avoidance has become more rather 
than less important in terms of explaining spread changes after the adoption of market reforms.   
The estimated intercept when explaining changes in absolute spreads is negative (-0.213) and 
significant (t-statistic = -5.98) when avoidance variables are excluded from the regression, but does not 
differ significantly from zero when avoidance measures are included.  This indicates that the reduction in 
average spreads after listing cannot be explained by changes in the variables other than odd eighth 
avoidance, i.e. by changes in share price, trading activity, or return volatility.  However, the reduction in 
average quoted spreads can be fully explained when the reduction in avoidance is included as an 
explanatory power.   
Share price changes have significant explanatory power for spread changes, with spreads widening 
in absolute terms and falling in percentage terms for stocks with share price increases.  The estimated 
coefficient on the post-reform indicator is positive and marginally significant, which indicates a smaller 
decline in spreads at Exchange listing after the Nasdaq reforms.   The other variables included in the 
multiple regression, including trading activity, market capitalization, and the change in return volatility 
have relatively little explanatory power for spread changes.    
To summarize, changes in odd-eighth avoidance dominate cross-sectional variation in spread 
reductions after Exchange listing, and this effect became stronger rather than weaker after the 1997 reforms 
of the Nasdaq market.  Cross-sectional variation in other variables (trading activity, market capitalization, 
and change in return volatility) do not explain the average reduction in bid-ask spreads, but when the 
change in odd-eight avoidance is included the reduction in average spreads can be fully explained.   
A.2. Changes in Volatility 
 Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of estimating cross-sectional regressions to explain post-
listing changes in the volatility of daily and intraday quote-midpoint returns.  The coefficient estimates 
 
volume on Nasdaq and the NYSE. 
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reveal relatively little systematic cross-sectional variation in volatility changes – adjusted R2 statistics range 
from just .011 to .027.   The change in volatility is negatively but insignificantly related to pre-listing 
volume, and positively and marginally significantly related to post-listing volume.   The change in the 
average share price is significantly related to the change in the volatility of daily returns, while the relation 
between average share price changes and intraday volatility is marginally significant.   The coefficient 
estimate on the Nasdaq reform indicator is positive and marginally significant when explaining the change 
in daily volatility, though this effect disappears when avoidance variables are included in the regression.   
The intercept estimate in the daily volatility regression is negative and statistically significant when 
avoidance variables are excluded, indicating that the other explanatory variables do not explain the 
reduction in mean volatility.  However, the intercept estimate becomes statistically insignificant when 
avoidance variables are included.   The change in the quoted spread is marginally significant when 
explaining the change in intraday volatility, but this effect is also subsumed when avoidance variables are 
included in the regression.   
  The overall conclusion from this Table is that changes in spreads have weak power in explaining 
changes in volatility following exchange listing.  However, similar to our cross sectional analysis of spread 
changes, odd-eighth avoidance can explain volatility changes.  The continued dominance of odd-eighth 
avoidance as an explanatory variable for spread and volatility changes in the wake of the 1997 market 
reforms is puzzling.    
B. Endogeneity of Spreads, Volume, and Volatility 
 The preceding analysis provides information regarding cross-sectional variation in spread and 
volatility reductions after Exchange listing, in a multivariate setting.  However, it can be argued that this 
analysis is incomplete, as it does not take into account the endogenous nature of bid-ask spreads, trading 
activity, and return volatility.   It is possible that the reductions in average spreads documented here and in 
prior studies and the reduction in average volatility documented here are not attributable to Exchange listing 
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per se, but result from changes in other endogenous or exogenous variables that occur around the time of 
listing.   
 Both inventory-based (e.g. Ho and Stoll, 1980) and information-based (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom 
1985) theories of bid-ask spreads imply that spreads should vary positively with volatility.  This raises the 
possibility that the observed spread reductions might be attributable to volatility reductions.   Further, 
Demsetz (1968) argues that spreads should vary inversely with typical trading activity, ceteris paribus, and 
volume is not held constant in the analysis. 
 It is also well-documented that trading activity and return volatility are positively correlated  
(Karpoff [1987] reviews eighteen such studies, and more recent evidence is presented by Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes [1990]).   Clark [1973] and Tauchen and Pitts [1983] develop the "mixture of distributions" 
hypothesis, in which the sequential arrival of new information endogenously generates both trading volume 
and price movements, with both increasing during periods characterized by numerous information shocks.   
 It could also be argued that spreads are determinants of trading activity if the demand for liquidity 
is downward sloping in the price of liquidity.  Further, spreads could affect volatility by changing informed 
traders’ incentives to act on the information they acquire.  In short, spreads, trading activity, and volatility 
are jointly determined in equilibrium.   To provide more definitive evidence on whether Exchange listing 
has a structural effect on these endogenous variables we estimate a system of simultaneous equations by 
two stage least squares. 
 As noted in Section III.A. above, reported trading volumes are not directly comparable across 
dealer and auction markets, which precludes focusing on changes in this endogenous variable from the pre-
listing to post-listing periods.  Instead, we use as the basic unit of observation firm level averages computed 
from the 90 days before and 90 days after Exchange listing.  Each regression therefore includes 308 
observations, corresponding to the pre and post listing observations on each of the 154 firms in the 




• The average bid-ask spread for the firm during the 90 days before and after listing. 
• The volatility of close-to-close midpoint returns, computed from the 90 days before and after 
listing. 
• Average reported volume during the 90 days before and 90 days after listing. 
Market Structure Variables 
• An NYSE indicator that equals one for observations computed from the 90 days after listing and 
that equals zero for observations from the 90 days before listing. 
• Odd eighth avoidance, measured as the time-weighted percentage of quotes at even-eighths of a 
dollar, before and after listing. 
• The product of spread and the NYSE indicator, 
• The product of volatility and the NYSE indicator, 
• The product of the avoidance measure and the NYSE indicator, 
Exogenous Variables: 
• Overall market volatility, measured as the volatility of S&P 500 index returns during the firm-
specific 90 days before and after Exchange listing, 
• Overall market trading activity, proxied by total NYSE volume during the firm-specific 90 day 
intervals before and after Exchange listing, 
• Market capitalization at the listing date, 
• Average share price during the pre and post listing periods, 
• An indicator variable that equals one for stocks that transferred after Nasdaq reforms were 
implemented.   
 
 To assess whether market structure has a structural effect on the endogenous variables we test 
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whether the coefficients associated with the NYSE indicator variable are non zero.  The NYSE indicator 
itself measures shifts in estimated intercepts after Exchange listing, while the product of the NYSE indicator 
and other variables measure shifts in estimated slope coefficients after Exchange listing.   Regression 
intercepts in general measure the mean of the dependent variable, conditional on all explanatory variables 
equaling zero.   Estimates of shifts in average spreads and volatility conditional on zero market 
capitalization, zero share price, zero market volume, etc., are of no practical interest.  To obtain meaningful 
estimates, we deduct from each firm-specific explanatory variable the cross-sectional mean of that 
explanatory variable, computed from the pre-listing observations.9  The NYSE indicator coefficients 
therefore measure shifts in intercepts and slope coefficients for stocks with avoidance equal to the pre-
listing mean, share price equal to the pre-listing mean, market volatility and volume equal to the mean 
observed during the last 90 days on Nasdaq, etc.   
 To estimate the simultaneous system requires the imposition of a sufficient number of exclusion 
restrictions.  Market volume and market volatility are excluded from the spread equation, under the 
reasoning that these exogenous variables will affect firm specific volume and volatility, which in turn affect 
spreads.  Avoidance and market volume are excluded from the volatility regression.  The reasoning with 
respect to quote rounding is that avoidance directly affects spreads but not volatility, so that the impact of 
spreads on volatility can be identified.  The reasoning with respect to market volume is that overall volume 
should not affect volatility except through effects on firm-specific volume.  The volume regression excludes 
avoidance and market volatility, again under the reasoning that avoidance should not affect directly volume, 
except through a possible affect on spreads, and that market volatility should not affect trading activity with 
firm-specific volatility included in the specification. 
 Table 8 reports the results of estimating this simultaneous system by two stage least squares.  
Focusing first on spreads as the endogenous variable, avoidance is highly significant in explaining spreads 
 
9 As a sensitivity test we also estimated the system after deducting the full sample (computed across the pre and post-
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(t-statistic = 17.65), but less so after NYSE listing (t-statistic for the change in slope = -6.48).10   Higher 
volatility is associated with wider bid-ask spreads (t-statistic = 3.45), as predicted by inventory and 
information based theories of the spread, but the sensitivity is less on the NYSE (t-statistic for the change in 
slope = -2.16).   Surprisingly, spreads are not significantly affected by trading activity.    Spreads are 
positively related to share price, and after controlling for variation in other exogenous and endogenous 
variables, are actually higher on average post-reform.  Most importantly, note the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate on the NYSE indicator.  This indicates that the market structure of the 
NYSE is associated with lower average spreads, even after allowing for changes in other endogenous and 
exogenous variables.    
 Consider next results obtained when return volatility is the dependent variable.  Higher firm 
specific volume and higher market-wide volume are both associated with greater volatility (t-statistics of 
5.01 and 2.40, respectively), as would be expected if increased trading activity signifies larger information 
flows.  Larger stocks have returns that are less volatile (t-statistic = -2.29), while volatility has been greater 
post-reform (t-statistic = 2.16).   Wider spreads are associated with greater volatility (t-statistic = 3.25).  
This result is potentially important, because it is at odds with the reasoning of those who favor transactions 
taxes (e.g. Summers and Summers (1989)), who have argued that volatility can be decreased by increasing 
transactions costs.    
 Finally, note that the coefficient estimate on the NYSE indicator does not differ significantly from 
zero, and that a joint test of the hypothesis that all coefficient estimates that involve the NYSE indicator are 
zero cannot be rejected (p-value = .740).  This indicates that Exchange listing does not have a significant 
structural effect on return volatility.  The observed reduction in average volatility after Exchange listing can 
be attributed to changes in other endogenous and exogenous variables, including the structural reduction in 
bid-ask spreads.   
 
listing observations) cross-sectional mean from each firm-specific explanatory variable.  All inference was unaffected. 
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 Finally, consider the specification where trading volume is the dependent variable.  Trading volume 
is positively related to same stock volatility, strongly related to market capitalization (t-statistic = 20.70), 
and has decreased post reform (t-statistic = -3.47).  The interpretation of the NYSE-listing variables in this 
specification is clouded by differences in reporting conventions across dealer and auction markets.  
Coefficient estimates on the NYSE indicators will reflect effects of both reporting differences and actual 
changes in customer trading proclivity.  The joint hypothesis that all coefficients involving the NYSE 
indicator are zero is rejected (p-value = .003), indicating that reported volume is structurally related to 
NYSE listing.  Surprisingly, however, in light of differences in reporting conventions, the coefficient 
estimate on the NYSE indicator is insignificant.   
 To summarize, the analysis of trading volume, return volatility, and bid-ask spreads as a 
simultaneous system of endogenous variables provides several results consistent with microstructure theory 
(e.g. spreads widen with volatility and share price, greater volume is associated with higher volatility), one 
result (volatility increases when spreads increase) that is at odds with the reasoning of those who support 
transactions taxes, and one result that is puzzling in light of recent market reforms (spreads remain in the 
recent data significantly related to the avoidance of odd eighth quotes).   The results indicate that Exchange 
listing is associated with a structural reduction in bid-ask spreads even after allowing for changes in other 
endogenous and exogenous variables, but that the observed reduction in average volatility can be attributed 
to changes in other variables, including the reduction in spreads. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
This study examines changes in trading costs and volatility for 320 firms that moved from the 
Nasdaq stock market to the New York Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2000.  Consistent with results reported 
by Christie and Huang (1994), Kadlec and McDonnell (1994), and Barclay (1997) for earlier samples, we 
 
10 This result is consistent with that reported by Bessembinder (1997), who examined a matched sample of NYSE and 
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find that bid-ask spreads in the recent data continue to decrease substantially upon Exchange listing, even 
after the implementation during 1997 of several reforms of the Nasdaq market.11  Further, the magnitude of 
the reduction in bid-ask spreads remains, as documented by Barclay (1997) for an earlier sample, closely 
related to whether Nasdaq market makers made use of odd-eighth quotations.   We extend the analysis to 
return volatility, documenting that returns are significantly less volatile after Exchange listing.  The 
reduction in average volatility is not attributable to reductions in “bid-ask” bounce, and cannot be explained 
by changes in contemporaneous market-wide volatility. 
The results of this analysis are also relevant to the recurring argument that return volatility can be 
decreased by imposing a “transactions tax”.  Summers and Summers (1989), Stiglitz (1989), and 
Eichengreen, Tobin, and Wyploz (1995) have argued for taxes on financial market transactions, reasoning 
that higher trading costs will curb “excessive” speculation.  The results reported here indicate that trading 
costs and return volatility both decrease substantially after Exchange listing.   Further, simultaneous 
equation methods indicate that an increase in trading costs is associated with an increase in return volatility, 
rather than a decrease as the proponents of transactions taxes presume.  
 Finally, we use simultaneous equation methods to examine the extent to which changes in 
endogenous spreads and volatility can be attributed to market structure, as opposed to changes in other 
variables.   For example, microstructure theory implies that volatility affects equilibrium bid-ask spreads, 
which raises the possibility that the decrease in average spreads after Exchange listing as documented here 
and by earlier authors could be attributable to reductions in volatility or changes in other variables rather 
than market structure, per se.   The results of the simultaneous equation estimation indicates that Exchange 
listing is indeed associated with a structural reduction in bid-ask spreads, even after allowing for changes in 
 
Nasdaq stocks rather than stocks that changed listing. 
11 One caveat that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study, as well as other studies of 
Exchange listings, is that the decision to list is also endogenous.  To the extent that managers can ascertain cross-
sectional variation in the costs and benefits of Exchange listing, firms that choose to list are likely to be those with the 
best cost-benefit tradeoffs.  As a consequence care must be exercised in extrapolating from the trading costs reductions 
observed for firms that do list in order to project possible trading cost savings for broader populations of companies. 
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other endogenous and exogenous variables, but that the observed reduction in average volatility can be 
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Descriptive statistics for 320  (full sample) and 154 (restricted sample) firms that moved from Nasdaq to be listed on the NYSE between 1996 and 2000.  Results 
pertain to 90 calendar days before and after the listing date.  The restricted sample is a subset of the full sample containing firms that have at least 1 quote update 
between  9:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. on each sample date.  
 
   Full Sample Restricted sample 
   Mean Median Min Max  mean Median min max 
    
Market Capitalization (in Million $) 1025.97 466.49 18.89 19781.28  1629 877.49 18.89 19781.28 
    
Share Price (in 100 shares)  
 Before listing 29.43 26.16 3.10 113.04 32.18 28.34 3.16 95.74
 After listing 30.11 26.6 2.65 137.52 31.48 28.66 2.83 106.18
    
Number of quotes per day per firm   
 Before listing 125.36 29.17 1.83 4809.81 214.32 96.06 9.90 4809.81
 After listing 113.78 64.2 7.34 1686.85 177.03 123.04 9.90 1686.80
    
Quote size (in 100 shares)  
 Before listing 14.96 14.91 3.41 41.03 14.79 14.93 3.41 33.08
 After listing 51.38 34.16 4.85 424.19 53.04 35 11.12 335.87
   
Proportion of quotes occurring at even multiples 
of eighths of dollar  
 
 Before listing 59.85 52.42 3.73 100 47.59 45.3 18.63 96.13
 After listing 41.13 40.67 0 85.89 35.87 34.29 0 64.24
    
Number of days with at least 1 quote update  
 Before listing 54.23 60 1 63 61.76 62 60 63





Changes in Spreads and Volatility 
Measures of volatility and spreads for 320  (full sample) and 154 (restricted sample) firms that moved from Nasdaq to be listed on the NYSE between 
1996 and 2000.  All return measures are based on quotation midpoints.  The restricted sample is a subset of the full sample containing firms that have at 
least 1 quote update between  9:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. on each sample date.  
 
   Median Median Median  Binomial Mean Mean Mean
Full Sample (N=320)  Nasdaq NYSE Change % decline p-value Nasdaq NYSE Change
    
Market capitalization on listing date (in  million $) 466 466  1026 1026
Time-weighted  quoted spreads (in cents ) 33.88 19.19 -14.11 89.39 0.0000 44.74 20.00 -24.75
Time-weighted  quoted spreads (in percent of share price) 1.41 0.74 -0.63 85.31 0.0000 1.66 0.82 -0.91
Close-to-close volatility (in %) 2.59 2.29 -0.24 63.12 0.0000 3.15 2.63 -0.51
Half-hourly volatility (in %) 0.47 0.53 0.04 41.56 0.0029 0.54 0.69 0.14
     
Restricted Sample (N=154)   
Market capitalization on listing date (in  million $) 877 877  1629 1629
Time-weighted  quoted spreads (in cents ) 24.95 16.73 -6.28 81.8 0.0000 30.81 17.68 -13.13
Time-weighted  quoted spreads (in percent of share price) 0.87 0.62 -0.24 74.6 0.0000 1.08 0.69 -0.39
Close-to-close volatility (in %) 3.06 2.83 -0.29 64.29 0.0000 3.64 3.26 -0.39
















Time Weighted Means and Medians of Quoted Bid-Ask Spreads in Cents per Share. 
Reported are average spreads between primary market bid and ask quotes, for 154 firms that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE between 1996 and 2000.  The 
sample covers the last 90 days on Nasdaq and the first 90 days on the NYSE for each stock.  The mean spread before and after Exchange listing is computed 
for each company by time weighting each individual observation.  Reported are cross-sectional means and medians of the firm-by-firm spread measures while 
The 154 firms are divided into three subsamples of approximately equal number of firms according to the following categories: by stock market capitalization 
on the date of listing (market capitalization), by time-weighted average spread on the Nasdaq (mean Nasdaq spread), and by frequency of Nasdaq quotes 
occurring on the even multiple of eights of a dollar (odd-eighth avoidance).  Post-reform refers to companies that were subject to new Nasdaq order-handling 
rules and a tick size of one-sixteenth dollars for 90 days before exchange listing.  The binomial p-value is obtained from a sign test of the hypothesis that the 
probability of a decline in spreads is 0.5. The t-stat is obtained from the univariate test that the mean change is zero. 
  
 
   Median Median  % of firms  Mean Mean   
   Nasdaq NYSE Median With Binomial Nasdaq NYSE Mean  
Sample Firms Number Spread Spread Change Decline P-value Spread Spread Change t-stat 
            
All firms  154 24.95 16.73 -6.28 81.8 0.0000 30.81 17.68 -13.13 -7.56 
By market capitaliz  ation           
 Smallest third 51 33.05 17.98 -14.68 92.1 0.0000 37.61 18.98 -18.63 -4.95 
 Middle third 52 25.64 17.72 -9.38 84.6 0.0000 31.69 18.53 -13.15 -6.01 
 Largest third 51 17.42 14.56 -2.5 68.6 0.0000 23.12 15.51 -7.60 -2.78 
By Nasdaq re  form           
 Pre 41 26.57 17.3 -11.34 97.5 0.0000 35.68 18.31 -17.37 -5.37 
 Post 113 23.25 16.46 -4.95 76.1 0.0000 29.05 17.45 -11.59 -5.67 
By Mean Nasdaq sp  read           
 Smallest third 51 14.28 13.67 -0.18 63.7 0.5294 13.72 13.51 -0.21 -0.66 
 Middle third 52 24.95 17.26 -6.35 92.3 0.0000 25.19 18.25 -6.94 -8.57 
 Largest third 51 44.57 18.85 -24.16 100.0 0.0000 53.63 21.27 -32.37 -8.25 
By odd-eighth avoidance           
 Lowest Third 51 14.39 13.9 -0.05 49.0 0.7534 14.98 14.3 -0.67 -1.26 
 Medium Third 52 26.93 17.2 -8.46 98.1 0.0000 28.04 18.16 -9.88 -9.82 






Average Volatility of Daily Returns, Based on Last Daily Quote. 
Daily returns are computed for 90 days before and after Exchange listing for 154 firms that moved from Nasdaq to 
the NYSE between 1996 and 2000.  Returns are based on the midpoint of the last daily quotation.  Reported are 
cross-sectional medians of standard deviations of these daily returns, before and after Exchange listing, in percent.  
The binomial p-value is obtained from a sign test of the hypothesis that the probability of a decline in volatility is 
0.5.   The 154 firms are divided into three subsamples of approximately equal number of firms according to the 
following categories: by stock market capitalization on the date of listing (market capitalization), by time-weighted 
average spread on the Nasdaq (mean Nasdaq spread), and by frequency of Nasdaq quotes occurring on the even 
multiple of eights of a dollar (odd-eighth avoidance).  Post-reform refers to companies that were subject to new 


































All Firms 154 3.06 2.83 -0.29 64.3 0.0004 
    
By Market Capitalization    
   Smallest Third 51 3.06 2.86 -0.37 70.6 0.0025 
   Medium Third 52 3.33 2.95 -0.24 59.6 0.2154 
   Largest Third 51 2.89 2.70 -0.19 62.7 0.0575 
    
By Nasdaq Reform    
   Pre-Reform 41 2.98 2.45 -0.50 75.6 0.0003 
   Post-Reform 113 3.12 2.93 -0.21 60.2 0.0407 
    
By Mean Nasdaq Spread    
 Smallest Third of Sample 51 3.82 3.09 -0.15 56.9 0.1890 
 Middle Third 52 2.97 2.79 -0.20 61.5 0.1742 
 Largest Third 51 2.97 2.43 -0.68 74.5 0.0009 
    
By Odd-Eighth Avoidance    
  Low Avoidance 51 3.43 3.09 -0.06 50.9 0.9999 
  Medium 52 3.42 3.02 -0.59 67.3 0.0019 






Average Volatility of Daily Returns, Relative to Overall Market 
Daily returns are computed for each firm, based on closing quotation midpoints, for 90 days before and after 
Exchange listing, for 154 firms that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE between 1996 and 2000.  Standard 
deviations of these daily returns are then computed for each firm, and each standard deviation is divided by 
the standard deviation of S&P 500 Index returns over the same 90-day interval.  Reported are cross-sectional 
medians of the firm-by-firm volatility measures.  The binomial p-value is obtained from a sign test of the 
hypothesis that the probability of a decline in volatility is 0.5.   The 154 firms are divided into three 
subsamples of approximately equal number of firms according to the following categories: by stock market 
capitalization on the date of listing (market capitalization), by time-weighted average spread on the Nasdaq 
(mean Nasdaq spread), and by frequency of Nasdaq quotes occurring on the even multiple of eights of a dollar 
(odd-eighth avoidance).  Post-reform refers to companies that were subject to new Nasdaq order-handling 


































All Firms 154 2.84 2.33 -0.54 74.2 0.0000 
    
By Market Capitalization    
   Small Firms 51 2.83 2.35 -0.67 76.5 0.0002 
   Medium Firms 52 2.84 2.35 -0.58 78.8 0.0000 
   Large Firms 51 2.88 2.32 -0.37 66.7 0.0118 
    
By Nasdaq Reform    
   Pre-Reform 41 3.40 2.22 -0.82 92.7 0.0000 
   Post-Reform 113 2.74 2.38 -0.37 67.3 0.0002 
    
By Mean Nasdaq Spread    
  Smallest Third of Sample 51 3.13 2.67 -0.33 70.6 0.0003 
  Middle Third 52 2.81 2.31 -0.55 71.2 0.0047 
  Largest Third 51 3.04 2.23 -0.69 80.4 0.0000 
    
By Odd-Eighth Avoidance    
  Low Avoidance 51 2.75 2.60 -0.30 62.7 0.0140 
  Medium 52 3.00 2.47 -0.56 75.0 0.0002 





Average Volatility of Daily Returns, Based on Opening and Closing Quotes. 
Intraday returns are computed for each firm for 90 days before and after Exchange listing, based on the 
midpoint of the quote in effect at 9:30 am and the last quote of the day.  Standard deviations of these intraday 
returns in percent are then computed for each firm, before and after Exchange listing.  Reported are cross-
sectional medians of the firm-by-firm volatility measures.  The binomial p-value is obtained from a sign test 
of the hypothesis that the probability of a decline in volatility is 0.5.   The 154 firms are divided into three 
subsamples of approximately equal number of firms according to the following categories: by stock market 
capitalization on the date of listing (market capitalization), by time-weighted average spread on the Nasdaq 
(mean Nasdaq spread), and by frequency of Nasdaq quotes occurring on the even multiple of eights of a dollar 
(odd-eighth avoidance).  Post-reform refers to companies that were subject to new Nasdaq order-handling 
































All Firms 154 2.86 2.64 -0.17 58.4 0.0056 
    
By Market Capitalization    
   Small Firms 51 2.93 2.73 -0.24 64.7 0.0122 
   Medium Firms 52 2.87 2.74 -0.11 53.8 0.6795 
   Large Firms 51 2.67 2.55 -0.13 56.9 0.0614 
    
By Nasdaq Reform    
   Pre-Reform 41 2.74 2.36 -0.31 70.7 0.0026 
   Post-Reform 113 2.88 2.73 -0.11 53.9 0.1093 
    
By Mean Nasdaq Spread    
 Smallest Third of Sample 51 3.44 2.97 -0.09 52.9 0.4532 
 Middle Third 52 2.68 2.61 -0.17 55.8 0.4606 
 Largest Third 51 2.71 2.36 -0.49 66.7 0.0004 
    
By Odd-Eighth Avoidance    
  Low Avoidance 51 3.16 3.02 0.15 47.1 0.7394 
  Medium 52 3.03 2.88 -0.24 57.7 0.0460 
  High Avoidance 51 2.56 2.22 -0.31 70.6 0.0007
 
Table 7 
Cross sectional relations among Change in Spreads, Change in Volatilities, and Firm Characteristics. 
Reported are coefficients obtained in cross sectional regressions of average change in time-weighted spreads and return volatilities on several 
characteristics of 154 firms that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE between 1996 and 2000. Nasdaq reform is an indicator variable that is 1 if the 
firm was subject to new Nasdaq order-handling rules and a tick size of one-sixteenth dollars for 90 days before exchange listing, and 0 
otherwise. Market capitalization refers to the stock market value of the firm (in millions dollars) on the day of listing. Change in share price is 
the change in average closing share prices (in dollars) before and after listing. Change in odd-eighth avoidance refers to the change in frequency 
of quotes occurring on the even multiple of eighths of a dollar on the Nasdaq and the NYSE. Volumes are averages of reported daily volumes on 
the two exchanges. The t-statistic is for the hypothesis that the associated coefficient estimate equals zero. 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variables are Changes in spread 
    Change in quoted spreads in cents  Change in quoted spreads in percent of 
share price 
    Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat        
     
Intercept    -0.2133 -5.98 -0.0113 -0.25  -0.6148 -6.68 -0.2955 -2.46
   
Nasdaq Reform Indicator  0.0079 1.98 0.0371 0.76  0.0165 1.64 0.2791 2.13
Market capitalizationa  0.0055 0.48 0.0072 0.85  0.0468 1.59 0.0438 1.91
Change in share price  0.0054 2.64 0.0046 3.01  -0.0089 1.69 -0.0122 2.97
Average volume on Nasdaq  0.0409 0.77 -0.0069 -0.16  0.0780 0.57 0.0177 0.15
Average volume on NYSE  -0.0134 -0.20 0.0059 0.12  -0.0461 -0.26 -0.0107 -0.08
     
Change in quotes per daya  0.0045 0.06  0.2216 1.15
Change in odd-eighth avoidance 0.9990 6.11  1.6761 3.82
Reform indicator*avoidance  0.5497 2.37  2.4894 4.00
     
Change in close-to-close return standard 
deviation 
0.0016 0.22 -0.0010 -0.19  0.0357 1.90 0.0316 2.20
     










Panel B: Dependent Variables are Changes in volatility 
    Change in close-to-close daily return 
standard deviation 
 Change in open-to-close daily return 
standard deviation 
    Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
     
Intercept    -1.03 -2.32 -0.4402 -0.63  0.0735 0.14 -0.3583 -0.44
   
Nasdaq Reform Indicator  0.8173 1.81 0.2341 0.31  0.2651 0.51 1.1432 1.29
Market capitalizationa  0.0094 0.07 0.0264 0.20  -0.0512 -0.34 -0.0765 -0.49
Change in share price  0.0510 2.16 0.0561 2.32  -0.0487 -1.77 -0.0490 -1.75
Average volume on Nasdaq  -0.6968 -1.15 -0.9551 -1.44  -0.6609 -0.94 -0.5694 -0.74
Average volume on NYSE  1.2699 1.64 1.3560 1.72  1.0194 1.13 1.0506 1.15
     
Change in quotes per daya    -0.9572 -0.86    0.5994 0.46
Change in odd-eighth avoidance   2.6986 0.94    -0.8274 -0.25
Reform indicator*avoidance    -2.1336 -0.58    6.6034 1.54
     
Change in quoted spread in cents 0.2078 0.22 -0.2494 -0.19  2.0332 1.84 0.8932 0.59
     
Adj R-sq.    0.0270 0.0154  0.0119 0.0108








Simultaneous equation estimation of Spread, Volatility and Volume. 
Reported are coefficients obtained from a system of equations with spread, volatility and volume as endogenous variables for 
154 firms that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE between 1996 and 2000.  The coefficients are estimated by using two stage 
least squares method.  For each exchange, endogenous variables are calculated as follows: spread is the time weighted average 
quoted spread in cents; volatility is the standard deviation of returns based on daily close-to-close returns; volume is the 
average reported daily trading volume. The NYSE indicator is 1 if the firm is on the NYSE or 0 otherwise. Nasdaq reform is 
an indicator variable that is 1 if the firm was subject to new Nasdaq order-handling rules and a tick size of one-sixteenth 
dollars for 90 days before exchange listing, or 0 otherwise.  Market capitalization refers to the stock market value of the firm 
(in millions dollars) on the day of listing.  Share price (in dollars) is the average closing stock price.  Avoidance refers to the 
frequency of quotes occurring on the even multiple of eighths of a dollar on each exchange. Market volatility and market 
volume are contemporaneous standard deviation of daily S&P500 returns and contemporaneous NYSE trading daily trading 
volume on each exchange, respectively.  All independent variables, except indicator variables, are adjusted by subtracting the 
mean of its average on the Nasdaq. The t-statistic is for the hypothesis that the associated coefficient estimate equals zero. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Spread Volatility Volume 
    Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat  
    0.2364 15.84 3.2241 12.90 0.9159 8.36  
Intercept    -0.0810 -4.70 0.2909 0.64 0.1089 0.67  
NYSE indicator          
           
Spread     2.3152 3.25 -0.3338 -1.30  
Volatility   0.0144 3.45   0.0985 3.74  
Volume   -0.0024 -0.27 0.7912 5.01    
           
Avoidance   1.1406 17.65      
Market volatility   0.8981 2.40    
Market volume       0.0003 1.13  
           
Spread*NYSE indicator    2.35 0.77 2.35 0.77  
Volatility*NYSE indicator -0.0131 -2.16   -0.0090 -0.23  
           
Avoidance*NYSE Indicator -0.7199 -6.48      
           
market cap   -0.0072 -1.75 -0.1700 -2.29 0.3470 20.70  
Share Price   0.0025 6.01 -0.0065 -0.77 -0.0126 -4.28  
Nasdaq Reform 
Indicator 
  0.9885 5.92 0.5824 2.16 -0.4518 -3.47  
     
Adj r-sq.    0.6700 0.1264  0.6514
    F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
F-test*    15.73 0.0001 0.3000 0.7403 4.77 0.0029 
     
*The null hypothesis being tested is that all coefficient estimates involving the NYSE listing indicator are jointly equal 
to zero. 
 
 
